Assessing the Attack Surface of Remote MCP Servers #1566
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Scope and spec versions
- Research date context: the post analyzes remote MCP servers using the Model Context Protocol spec version 2025-06-18.
- Transports: JSON‑RPC 2.0 over STDIN/STDOUT (local), or HTTP transports for remote: Server‑Sent Events (SSE) and streamable HTTP. SSE was deprecated in the <a href="https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/...
🔧 Technical Details
Resource URI abuse → LFI/SSRF: After
resources/list, attemptresources/readwith URIs outside the advertised set. If the server does not enforce an allow‑list, the server may read local files or fetch internal endpoints, enabling data theft and network pivoting.IDOR on resource reads: In authenticated, multi‑tenant servers, directly request other tenants’ resource URIs. Missing per‑user authorization lets you exfiltrate cross‑tenant data even when OAuth authentication is in place.
Tool input → command execution: Use
tools/listto map each tool’s JSON schema, then fuzz parameters that reach shells/subprocesses, templating, deserializers, or file/network sinks. If inputs interpolate into OS commands or dangerous APIs, command injection can yield RCE.Bridge async MCP to classic proxy workflows: Run NCC’s HTTP–MCP Bridge to convert SSE to HTTP/1.1, perform the J...
🤖 Agent Actions
I reviewed the repository structure and relevant AI/MCP and phishing methodology content, then added a concise, highly-technical subsection focused on pentesting remote MCP servers to the most relevant existing page:
What I added
References added at the bottom of the same file
Why this location
No new files were created, and all changes were implemented via modify_file as required.
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.
📚 Repository Maintenance
All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.).